The EU Looks to Central Asia for Energy Security by Rousseau, Richard
 The EU Looks to Central Asia for Energy Security  
Written by Richard Rousseau, Contributor | 16 January 2012  
There is a direct relationship between the availability and continuity of energy supplies and 
economic development. All world economies depend on the availability of energy and sound 
policies to generate and sustain growth. Global consumption has therefore increased exponentially 
in recent decades - a tendency which puts the “energy factor” at the forefront of the political and 
security agendas of the vast majority of states. The European Union (EU) is no exception, and as a 
body it is now turning more and more to Central Asian countries for additional energy resources as 
it strives to achieve energy security, diversity, and continuity of supply.  
Making informed and appropriate transactions is essential for the efficient operation of any energy 
policy and for maintaining its desired direction and momentum. Hence energy policy is of 
paramount importance for a diversity of stakeholders, not only for states. In the event of an 
interruption in supplies of raw materials or an unsustainable rise in prices, energy-importing 
countries are immediately faced with production slowdowns, and even stops, which in turn could 
trigger an economic recession of possibly great magnitude. Alternatively, faced with an excessive 
drop in the global price of energy or a loss of customers, producing countries - which are then 
deprived of either their sole or main source of much needed revenue and foreign currency - will 
have to find other ways to meet their internal and external budget obligations. In both scenarios, it is 
essential for consuming and producing countries to be able to find solutions to either achieve or 
maintain an acceptable level of “energy security” in order to guarantee economic well-being and 
political stability. 
The concept of energy security is not new. Winston Churchill pushed energy supply to the forefront 
of Great Britain’s national security on the eve of World War I, with this motto: “Safety and certainty 
in oil lie in variety and variety alone.” Ensuring the stability of energy supply continues to be the 
most important objective in world politics today. The term “energy security” has itself evolved over 
time, and to such a degree that it now includes various sets of interdependent, multidimensional, and 
transnational variables: Among the most critical of these are terrorism, political instability, 
economic conditions in many producing countries, and, finally, the underlying fear that geopolitical 
rivalry may at some point take a military dimension. 
Energy security: the EU’s perspective 
The EU has formulated its own specific definition of “energy security.” It describes it as the 
securing of “the immediate and longer-term availability of a diverse range of energy products at a 
price which is affordable to all consumers (domestic and industrial) while respecting environmental 
requirements.” The European energy security concept is based on two fundamental elements: the 
accessibility and reliability of the flow of raw materials and the economic sustainability of these 
supplies, both of which are dependent on market conditions. For example, in 2008 the EU had to 
import over half of its needed energy (53.8 percent). 
The energy dependency trend will continue as domestic demand is expected to further increase over 
the next two years, when it is projected that imports will account for approximately 70 percent of 
domestic need. The recent fluctuations in oil prices, tensions over Russian-Ukrainian gas supplies, 
intense competition for energy resources with China and, finally, the ever-growing attention to 
environmental sustainability are the main factors fueling the growth of the current sense of energy 
insecurity amongst European countries. In response, the EU has turned to a complex energy policy 
founded on the following principles: the diversification of the domestic energy mixture, the 
diversification of energy suppliers, an overall reduction of domestic consumption, and increased 
energy efficiency. 
This policy must carefully consider the timeframe in which it operates, as this largely determines the 
nature of future measures. In the short term, “energy security” means having the capacity to absorb 
sudden increases and decreases in energy demand regardless of the level of actual supply of 
hydrocarbons. In the long run, however, energy security becomes less a priority if investment 
projects, aimed at ensuring a continuity of supply and economic and environmental sustainability, 
are undertaken. Any effective approach must not only take into consideration both these short and 
long term aspects but also integrate them with other cross-cutting measures, such as the 
diversification of supply sources, production facilities, and storage and transport networks. 
It is necessary to effectively manage the risks inherent in the global energy market through a 
common – and continent-wide – EU policy. This can be brought about not only through a careful 
diversification of trading partners but through also a concomitant plan for the continued 
diversification of energy transport corridors and sources. More generally, because the availability of 
energy is an essential element of the security of all EU countries (even in the “classic” military 
application of the word), there must be a constant search to maintain market stability. 
It is no coincidence that the EU has made the development of energy markets in general and energy 
derivatives one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy. First, the EU strongly believes that research 
and technological development play a major role in diversifying sources of energy. It is for this 
reason that it has activated the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technical 
Development and the “Intelligent Energy – Europe” programme, committing to a 50 percent 
increase in annual spending on energy research. 
Second, it has also attempted to apply these research programs to developing interactive energy 
relationships with its neighbors. They are considered essential, as producers of raw materials and 
trading hubs must work in tandem and be integrated. To this end, the Energy Corridor Optimisation 
for the European Markets of Gas, Electricity, and Hydrogen project, which was launched in 2005, is 
intended to further promote the ongoing integration of the European energy market through 
developing a sustainable, compatible and interconnected infrastructure in keeping with 
environmental policy.[REF 10] 
International dimensions of EU energy policy: Central Asia 
More specifically, ensuring a sufficient number of reliable energy links is crucial to achieving the 
EU’s energy policy goals in Central Asia. The European Commission has produced a policy 
document, Europe 2020, which aims to provide a framework for a “strong and ambitious” energy 
policy. The international dimension of this policy is paramount and emphasizes the establishment of 
a series of partnerships with the major producing and transit countries which have significant 
quantities of hydrocarbons. 
This objective was also confirmed with the publication in September 2011 of another European 
Commission policy document - The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our 
Borders. This provides for the first time a comprehensive strategy for the EU’s external relations in 
the energy field. Furthermore, it sets out a serious political and economic commitment to Central 
Asia. It is clear that the EU is gradually constructing a regional policy and providing accompanying 
investment support. 
The continued regional dialogue on energy between the EU and Central Asian countries is governed 
by the 2004 Baku Initiative, which was initiated to achieve greater development of the energy 
markets in the Black Sea, the Caspian Basin and Central Asia through investment in infrastructure 
and energy efficiency programs. It also promotes the integration of regional markets and intends to 
facilitate the transit of oil and gas to Europe. In parallel to the Baku Initiative, Europe is committed 
to the INOGATE program, which aims to improve energy cooperation between the EU, Turkey, and 
countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), with the exceptions of the Baltic States and the 
Russian Federation and advocates the convergence of Central Asian states’ respective markets. The 
INOGATE program is expected to bring about increased imports and achieve export security by 
attracting new investment funds. This funded program, while maintaining its focus on the oil and 
gas sector in Central Asia, also focuses on electricity production, energy efficiency and supporting 
clean and renewable energy sources. The International Energy Agency (IEA), in fact, forecasts that 
the Central Asian states together will be responsible for as much as 70 percent of the increase in oil 
production outside OPEC expected in the next twenty years. 
To date, most European interventions in the region have not proceeded as successfully as first 
anticipated. A limited number of technical projects have actually been implemented and the results 
of the political dialogue are still unconvincing. Many European companies continue to invest in the 
region, especially in Kazakhstan, a country which is especially interested in diversifying its income 
sources and in collaborating with the EU in terms of infrastructure development, energy efficiency 
and transportation. Kazakhstan’s priority is to find efficient and expedient ways to export some of 
its energy resources to Western markets without having to pass through Russian territory. Its ability 
to export crude oil has recently increased due to the increased carrying capacity of the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (TBC) pipeline. For its part, Turkmenistan may test the new European energy policy, as its 
supply of energy is positioned to play a major role in the so-called “Southern Corridor,” which 
includes the fledgling Nabucco pipeline project. 
In April 2008 the European Commission and the Turkmenistan government signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding on a Strategic Energy Partnership which was devised to greatly increase the 
amount of gas to be held in reserve for exclusive supply to the EU. The European foothold in this 
country, however, rests on less than solid ground. For instance, the European Investment Bank, 
while showing interest in the Nabucco project, has not yet institutionalized its relations with 
Ashgabat. In addition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is cautious 
in dealing with Turkmenistan, because that country’s political and economic institutions lack 
transparency. It has not yet offered Ashgabat a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, although 
this type of agreement serves as the EU’s main delivery instrument for economic and political 
cooperation – the EU has already signed such an agreement with a majority of regional states. 
Challenges: interference, competition, divergence 
Central Asia has vast energy resources but is still a poor region, with one of the highest rates of 
authoritarianism and corruption in the world. The EU policy on energy, beyond pursuing energy 
security, should also involve implementing policies designed to reconcile its economic development 
objectives with the interests of supplier countries in the region. The challenges inherent in this task 
are numerous and of great magnitude. First of all, the EU still does not show unity of purpose in 
relation to the Nabucco project, which the European energy consortium of companies estimated the 
cost to be at 8.3 billion euros in February 2011. This is projected to become the major energy 
transport route linking Asia with Central Europe. In addition, the EU budget for regional 
cooperation in the years 2007-2010 was limited to 22 million euros, although a much higher sum 
should be set aside for the period 2011-2013. It is also questionable whether European credit 
institutions will be willing to finance the existing regional energy projects given the chronic political 
instability in the region, characterized by the persistence of the “frozen conflict” over Nagorno-
Karabakh and the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008, this on top the overall dismal 
financial situation within the EU itself. 
Nevertheless, Brussels continues to ask Central Asian governments to make a strong commitment to 
reforming their political structures in order to bring them more in line with Western political, 
environmental and technical standards. However, in spite of the best intentions, EU countries should 
not expect that the governments of the region will allow infringements on their sovereignty. 
Currently, these countries are not dependent on the EU’s imports or foreign direct investments. It is 
therefore not a given that additional Central Asian gas will be exported in the EU’s direction, not 
even in the medium term. The vast majority of the existing gas resources have already been 
allocated, under contractual agreements, to Russian and Chinese companies, which are indifferent to 
the internal political situations prevailing in their commercial partners. 
Central Asian states’ cooperation with the EU is purely strategic in nature. The entry of another 
energy competitor into the market strengthens the negotiating positions of these countries in their 
interactions with China and Russia, thus increasing energy prices, even to the direct disadvantage of 
European countries. The EU and Central Asia are now faced with a considerable divergence of 
interests: the “stans” are expecting both millions in investment and to maintain their political 
neutrality, while the EU is not positioned to provide them financial assistance without some strings 
attached to it. To provide aid unaccompanied by political expectations is unacceptable for many EU 
members. 
In addition, the EU has emerged as a somewhat unreliable partner, as it cannot speak with one 
concerted voice on the Nabucco project and many others. It is partially hamstrung when it has to 
develop a uniform, structured and long-term engagement with Central Asian heads of state. All this 
certainly complicates the future of the EU policy in a difficult region and threatens to undermine one 
of the pillars of European energy security: the diversification of the supply of raw materials. To be 
more present in Central Asia the EU has to capitalize on its previously expressed desire to provide 
economic, technical, and financial assistance to the countries of the region. Its only remaining room 
for maneuvers, therefore, seems to lie in staying focused on the strategic support policy for sustain 
political, social and economic development. 
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